

# 1      Introduction: understanding police innovation

---

*David Weisburd and Anthony A. Braga*

## **Introduction**

Over the last three decades American policing has gone through a period of significant change and innovation. In what is a relatively short historical time frame the police began to reconsider their fundamental mission, the nature of the core strategies of policing, and the character of their relationships with the communities that they serve. Innovations in policing in this period were not insular and restricted to police professionals and scholars, but were often seen on the front pages of America's newspapers and magazines, and spoken about in the electronic media. Some approaches, like broken windows policing – termed by some as zero tolerance policing – became the subject of heated political debate. Community policing, one of the most important police programs that emerged in this period, was even to give its name to a large federal agency – The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services – created by the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.

Some have described this period of change as the most dramatic in the history of policing (e.g., see Bayley 1994). This claim does not perhaps do justice to the radical reforms that led to the creation of modern police forces in the nineteenth century, or even the wide-scale innovations in tactics or approaches to policing that emerged after the Second World War. However, observers of the police today are inevitably struck by the pace and variety of innovation in the last few decades. Whether this period of change is greater than those of previous generations is difficult to know since systematic observation of police practices is a relatively modern phenomenon. But there is broad consensus among police scholars that the last three decades have “witnessed a remarkable degree of innovation in policing” (Committee to Review Research 2004: 82).

In this volume we bring together leading police scholars to examine the major innovations in policing that emerged during the last decades of the twentieth century. We focus on eight innovations that are concerned with change in police strategies and practices: community policing,

broken windows policing, problem-oriented policing, pulling levers policing, third-party policing, hot spots policing, Compstat and evidence-based policing. This is of course not an exhaustive list of innovation in policing during this period. For example, we do not examine technological innovations such as advances in computerized crime mapping or the use of DNA in criminal investigations. We also do not examine innovations in tactics and strategies that affected only specialized units or were applied to very specific types of crimes. Our approach was to identify innovations that had influence on the broad array of police tasks and on the practices and strategies that broadly affected the policing of American communities.

We title the chapters examining each police innovation reviewed in this volume under the heading “Advocate” and “Critic.” In this context our book seeks to clarify police innovation in the context of chapters written by those who have played important roles in developing innovation, and those who have stood as critics of such innovation. Nonetheless, we do not take a debate format in our book. Authors did not respond to each other’s papers, but rather sought to present a perspective that would clarify the benefits of the innovation examined, or the potential problems that the innovation raises for policing. The critics often identify promising elements of innovation while pointing out the difficulties that have been encountered in the applications of innovation in the field. The advocates often note the drawbacks of particular strategies, while arguing that they should be widely adopted. Accordingly, our chapters represent serious scholarly examination of innovations in policing, recognizing that established scholars may disagree about the directions that policing should take while drawing from the same empirical evidence.

By design the essays in this volume take a “micro” approach to the problem of police innovation, focusing on the specific components, goals, and outcomes associated with a specific program or practice. In this introductory chapter, we would like to take a “macro” approach to the problem of police innovation that allows us to see how innovation more generally emerged and developed during this period. We do not think that the dramatic surge in police innovation of the last few decades occurred as a matter of chance. Our approach is to see the development of innovation in policing as a response to a common set of problems and dilemmas. This approach can also help us to understand the broad trends of police innovation that we observe.

### **Understanding innovation and policing**

Many scholars seem to take for granted what strikes us as a central problem in understanding the broader phenomenon that our volume

examines. Why did we observe a period of significant innovation in policing in the last decades of the twentieth century? One simple answer to this question would be to note that institutions change, and that when faced with new ideas that have potential to improve their functioning they will naturally choose what is innovative. However, those who have studied the diffusion of innovation have been led to a very different view of the processes that underlie the adoption of new products, programs, or practices. Everett Rogers, who pioneered the scientific study of diffusion of innovation, argues, for example, that “more than just a beneficial innovation is necessary” to explain its widespread diffusion and adoption (1995: 8). Indeed, there are many examples of innovations that represent clear improvements over prior practice, yet fail to be widely adopted.

Rogers brings the example of the “Dvorak Keyboard” named after a University of Washington researcher, who sought to improve on the “Qwerty” keyboard in use since the late nineteenth century. The “Qwerty” keyboard was engineered to slow down typists in the nineteenth century in order to prevent jamming of keys that was common in the manual typewriters in that period. However, as the engineering of typewriters improved in the twentieth century, there was no longer a need for a keyboard engineered to slow typists down. Indeed, it seemed natural that a better arrangement of the keyboard would be developed that would allow for quicker typing that would cause less fatigue. Dvorak developed such a keyboard in 1932 basing his arrangement of the keys on time and motion studies. Dvorak’s keyboard was clearly an improvement on the Qwerty keyboard. It allowed for more efficient and faster typing, and led to less fatigue on the part of typists. But today more than seventy years after Dvorak’s development of a better and more efficient keyboard, the Qwerty keyboard remains the dominant method. Indeed, Dvorak’s keyboard is merely an interesting historical curiosity.

The diffusion of innovation requires that there be a “perceived need” for change in the social system in which an innovation emerges (Rogers 1995: 11). That need can be created by industries or interest groups, for example through advertisements that lead consumers to believe that they must have a particular new product or service. Often in social systems, the recognition that something must change is brought about by a period of crisis or challenge to existing programs or practices (see e.g., Rogers 1995; Altschuler and Behn 1997). In this context, we think that the key to understanding the emergence of a period of rapid innovation in policing in the last decades of the twentieth century lies in a crisis in policing that emerged in the late 1960s. Identifying that period of crisis can help us to understand not only why we observe so much police innovation in recent decades, but also why that innovation follows particular patterns of change.

*The crisis of confidence in American policing*

The decade of the 1970s began with a host of challenges to the police as well as the criminal justice system more generally (LaFree 1998). This was the case in part because of the tremendous social unrest that characterized the end of the previous decade. Race riots in American cities, and growing opposition, especially among younger Americans, to the Vietnam War, often placed the police in conflict with the young and with minorities. But American fears of a failing criminal justice system were also to play a role in a growing sense of crisis for American policing. In 1967, a presidential commission report on the Challenge of Crime in a Free Society reinforced doubts about the effectiveness of criminal justice in combating crime in the United States:

In sum, America's system of criminal justice is overcrowded and overworked, undermanned, underfinanced, and very often misunderstood. It needs more information and more knowledge. It needs more technical resources. It needs more coordination among its many parts. It needs more public support. It needs the help of community programs and institutions in dealing with offenders and potential offenders. It needs, above all, the willingness to reexamine old ways of doing things, to reform itself, to experiment, to run risks, to dare. It needs vision. (President's Commission 1967, 80–81)

Shortly after the presidential report on the Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, the Kerner Commission on Civil Disorders published a report which was also to raise significant questions about the nature of criminal justice in the United States, and the organization of American policing. However, in this case it was the question of race and the relationship between police and minority communities that was to have center stage. The challenges to patterns of American discrimination against African Americans were not focused primarily on the police, but the police, in addition to other criminal justice agencies, were seen as “part of the problem” and not necessarily working to help in producing a solution to difficult social issues:

In Newark, Detroit, Watts and Harlem, in practically every city that has experienced racial disruption since the summer of 1964, abrasive relationships between police and Negroes and other minority groups have been a major source of grievance, tension and ultimately disorder. (Kerner Commission 1968: 157)

The concerns of the commission reports in the 1960s and the sense of growing alienation between the police and the public in the latter half of that decade led policymakers, the police, and scholars to question the nature of American policing, and in particular the strategies that were

dominant in policing since World War II. A recent National Research Council Committee to Review Research on Police Policy and Practices has termed these approaches as the “standard model of policing” (Committee to Review Research 2004; see also Weisburd and Eck 2004):

This model relies generally on a “one size fits all” application of reactive strategies to suppress crime, and continues to be the dominant form of police practices in the United States. The standard model is based on the assumption that generic strategies for crime reduction can be applied throughout a jurisdiction regardless of the level of crime, the nature of crime, or other variations. Such strategies as increasing the size of police agencies, random patrol across all parts of the community, rapid response to calls for service, generally applied follow-up investigations, and generally applied intensive enforcement and arrest policies are all examples of this standard model of policing. (Weisburd and Eck 2004: 44)

A number of important questions about the standard model of policing had been raised in the 1960s. Nonetheless, there was little serious academic inquiry into the impact of policing strategies on crime or on public attitudes. The need for such research was apparent, and in the 1970s serious research attention was to begin. One important impetus for such studies of the police came from the federal government. With the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 a research arm of the Department of Justice was established, eventually to become the National Institute of Justice, which was to invest significant resources in research on police and other components of the criminal justice system. But important funding for research on policing was also to come from private foundations. Perhaps the most important contribution to policing was made by the Ford Foundation in 1970 when it established the Police Development Fund. The Fund and the Police Foundation which it established, was to foster a series of large-scale studies on American policing. McGeorge Bundy, then president of the Ford Foundation, argued in announcing the establishment of a Police Development Fund in 1970:

The need for reinforcement and change in police work has become more urgent than ever in the last decade because of rising rates of crime, increased resort to violence and rising tension, in many communities, between disaffected or angry groups and the police. (Bundy 1970)

With the establishment of the Police Foundation and the newly established federal support for research on the criminal justice system, the activities of the police began to come under systematic scrutiny by researchers. Until this time, there had been a general assumption that policing in the post-World War II era represented an important advance over previous decades and was effective in controlling crime.

For example, perhaps the dominant policing strategy in the post-World War II period was routine preventive patrol in police cars. It was drawn from a long history of faith in the idea of “police patrol” that had become a standard dogma of policing for generations. As George Kelling and his colleagues wrote in their introduction to the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, a study conducted by the Police Foundation:

Ever since the creation of a patrolling force in 13th century Hangchow, preventive patrol by uniformed personnel has been a primary function of policing. In 20th century America, about \$2 billion is spent each year for the maintenance and operation of uniformed and often superbly equipped patrol forces. Police themselves, the general public, and elected officials have always believed that the presence or potential presence of police officers on patrol severely inhibits criminal activity. (Kelling, Pate, Dieckman, and Brown 1974: 1)

Preventive patrol in police cars was the main staple of police crime prevention efforts at the beginning of the decade of the 1970s. As Kelling and colleagues noted in the Police Foundation report on the Kansas City study, “(t)oday’s police recruits, like virtually all those before them, learn from both teacher and textbook that patrol is the ‘backbone’ of police work” (Kelling *et al.* 1974: 1). The Police Foundation study sought to establish whether empirical evidence actually supported the broadly accepted assumptions regarding preventive patrol. The fact that questions were raised about routine preventive patrol suggests that the concerns about the police voiced in the decade before had begun to impact the confidence of police managers. As Kansas City Police Chief Clarence M. Kelley, later to become director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), said in explaining the need for the Kansas City experiment: “Many of us in the department had the feeling we were training, equipping, and deploying men to do a job neither we, nor anyone else, knew much about” (Murphy 1974: v).

To understand the impact of the Kansas City study on police managers and researchers, it is important to recognize not only that the study examined a core police practice but that its methodological approach represented a radical departure from the small-scale evaluations of police practices that had come earlier. The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment was a social experiment in policing on a grand scale, and it was conducted in a new Foundation that had significant resources and was backed by the well-established and respected Ford Foundation. Patrick Murphy, the distinguished police manager, and president of the Police Foundation at the time, suggests just how much the Foundation itself saw the experiment as a radical and important change in the quality of police research.<sup>1</sup>

This is a summary report of the findings of an experiment in policing that ranks among the few major social experiments ever to be completed. The experiment was unique in that never before had there been an attempt to determine through such extensive scientific evaluation the value of visible police patrol. (Murphy 1974: v)

This context, both in terms of the centrality of the strategy examined, the scale of the research, and the prestige of the institutions that supported the study, including the Kansas City Police Department and its chief, Clarence Kelley, were to give the findings of the study an impact that is in retrospect out of proportion to the actual findings. One study in one jurisdiction, no matter how systematic, cannot provide a comprehensive portrait of the effects of a strategy as broad as routine preventive patrol. Moreover, the study design was to come under significant academic criticism in later years (Minneapolis Medical Research Foundation 1976; Larson and Cahn 1985; Sherman and Weisburd 1995). Nonetheless, in the context of the decade in which it was conducted, this study was to have a critical impact upon the police and police researchers. This was especially the case since the research findings were to be consistent with a series of other studies of core police practices.

Kelling and his colleagues, in cooperation with the Kansas City Police Department, took fifteen police beats and divided them up into three groups. In five of these, called “reactive” beats, “routine preventive patrol was eliminated and officers were instructed to respond only to calls for service” (Kelling *et al.* 1974: 3). In five others, defined as “control” beats, “routine preventive patrol was maintained at its usual level of one car per beat” (*ibid.*: 3). In the remaining five beats, termed “proactive” beats, “routine preventive patrol was intensified by two to three times its usual level through the assignment of additional patrol cars” (Kelling *et al.* 1974: 3). When Kelling and his colleagues published the results of their study in 1974 it shattered one of the bedrock assumptions of police practitioners – that preventive patrol was an effective way to prevent crime and increase citizens’ feelings of safety. They concluded simply that increasing or decreasing the intensity of routine preventive patrol in police cars did not affect either crime, service delivery to citizens, or citizens’ feelings of security.

Another large-scale study conducted by William Spelman and Dale Brown and published in 1984 was also to challenge a core police assumption of that period – that improvement in rapid response to calls for service would lead to improvements in crime fighting. This study was developed in good part because of the findings of a prior investigation in Kansas City that found little support for the crime control effectiveness of rapid response to calls for service (Kansas City Police Department 1977).

With support from the National Institute of Justice, Spelman and Brown interviewed 4000 victims, witnesses, and bystanders in some 3300 serious crimes in four American cities. This was another major study in terms of the resources brought to bear and the methods used. Again it examined a strategy that was aided by technological advances in the twentieth century and that was a central dogma of police administrators – that police must get to the scene of a crime quickly if they are to apprehend criminal offenders. Spelman and Brown explained:

For at least half a century, police have considered it important to cut to a minimum their response times to crime calls. The faster the response, they have reasoned, the better the chances of catching a criminal at or near the scene of the crime. (Spelman and Brown 1984: xxi)

Based on the data they collected, however, Spelman and Brown provided a very different portrait of the crime control effectiveness of rapid response to calls for service:

Rapid police response may be unnecessary for three out of every four serious crimes reported to police. The traditional practice of immediate response to all reports of serious crimes currently leads to on-scene arrests in only 29 of every 1,000 cases. By implementing innovative programs, police may be able to increase this response-related arrest rate to 50 or even 60 per 1000, but there is little hope that further increases can be generated. (Spelman and Brown 1984: xix)

These findings based on a host of systematic data sources from multiple jurisdictions provided little support for the strategy of rapid response as a police practice to do something about crime. Indeed, Spelman and Brown found that citizen reporting time, not police response time, most influenced the possibility of on-scene arrest. Marginal improvement in police response times was predicted to have no real impact on the apprehension or arrest of offenders.

The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment and the National Institute of Justice study of police response time were not the only studies to “debunk” existing police practices. James Levine, for example, analyzed national crime data on the effectiveness of increasing the number of police in an article published in 1975. His title sums up his findings: “The Ineffectiveness of Adding Police to Prevent Crime.” Despite the fact that this effort and many others that challenged conventional police practices did not represent the kind of systematic data collection or analysis of the Police Foundation and National Institute of Justice studies, they followed a similar “narrative” which became increasingly common as the 1990s approached. Levine, for example, begins by noting the broad consensus for the principle that adding more police will make cities safer. He then

goes on to note that “(s)ensible as intensified policing may sound on the surface, its effectiveness in combating crime has yet to be demonstrated” (Levine 1975: 523). Finally, drawing upon simple tabular data on police strength and crime rates over time, he concludes:

It is tempting for politicians and government leaders to add more police: it is an intuitively sensible and symbolically satisfying solution to the unrelenting problem of criminal violence . . . The sad fact is, however, that they receive a false sense of security; in most situations they are just as vulnerable with these extra police as without them. (Levine 1975: 544)

Follow-up investigations were also the subject of critical empirical research during this period. The standard model of policing had assumed that general improvements in methods of police investigations would lead to crime control gains both because more active offenders would be imprisoned and thus unable to commit crime, and because potential offenders would be deterred by the prospect of discovery and arrest (Committee to Review Research 2004). But a series of studies in the 1970s and early 1980s suggested that investigations had little impact upon crime (Greenwood *et al.* 1975; Greenwood, Petersilia, and Chaiken 1977; Skogan and Antunes 1979; Eck 1983). This was the case in good part because many crimes, especially property crimes, were found to be unlikely to be solved by police investigations. These studies consistently showed that if citizens did not provide information about suspects to first responding officers, follow-up investigations were unlikely to lead to successful outcomes.

In retrospect, many of these studies overstated what could be learned about standard police practices from the findings gained (Weisburd and Eck 2004). And, in practice, there were evaluations in this period that produced more promising findings regarding standard police practices such as routine preventive patrol (e.g., see Press 1971; Schnelle, Kirchner *et al.* 1977; Chaiken 1978). Nonetheless, as the United States entered the decade of the 1990s there appeared to be a general consensus that traditional police practices did not work in preventing or controlling crime. As Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi wrote in their classic book *A General Theory of Crime* in 1990: “No evidence exists that augmentation of patrol forces or equipment, differential patrol strategies, or differential intensities of surveillance have an effect on crime rates” (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990: 270).

David Bayley wrote even more strongly in 1994:

The police do not prevent crime. This is one of the best kept secrets of modern life. Experts know it, the police know it, but the public does not know it. Yet the police pretend that they are society’s best defense against crime . . . This




Figure 1.1 Total violent crime (trends in violent crime rates by city size)

Source: Reiss and Roth, 1993

is a myth. First, repeated analysis has consistently failed to find any connection between the number of police officers and crime rates. Secondly, the primary strategies adopted by modern police have been shown to have little or no effect on crime. (Bayley 1994: 3)

This view of the ineffectiveness of policing strategies was reinforced by official crime statistics. These statistics, widely available to the public, suggested that the police were losing the “war on crime.” In particular, in America’s largest cities, with their well-established professional police forces, crime rates and especially violent crime rates were rising at alarming rates. Between 1973 and 1990 violent crime doubled (Reiss and Roth 1993). It did not take a statistician to understand that the trends were dramatic. For example, in Figure 1.1 we report the trends in violent crime rates by city size per 100,000 population. Clearly crime was on the rise, and the trend had been fairly consistent over a long period. Thus, not only were scholars showing that police strategies did little to impact upon crime, but the overall crime statistics commonly used by the government

and community to define police effectiveness were providing a similar message.

### Crisis and change in American policing

It is against this backdrop that the innovations that we examine in this volume develop. Our view is that the challenges to police effectiveness, rising crime rates, and concerns about the legitimacy of police actions that developed in the late 1960s created a perceived need for change in what some have described as the industry of American policing (Ostrom, Whitaker, and Parks 1978; Committee to Review Research 2004). Unfortunately, there is no hard empirical evidence that would allow us to make this link directly, since the study of the adoption of innovation has only recently become a subject of interest for police scholars (e.g., see Weiss 1997; Klinger 2003; Weisbord, Mastrofski, McNally *et al.* 2003). Accordingly, there have been few systematic studies of these processes and scholars were generally not concerned about the emergence of innovation as a research problem when these innovations were being developed.

Nonetheless, we think it reasonable to make a connection between the perceived failures of the standard model of American police practices and the experimentation with innovation, and openness to the adoption of innovation that occurred in the last decades of the twentieth century. Certainly, such a link is made by many of those who fostered innovation in policing. For example, in his proposal for a problem-oriented policing in 1979, Herman Goldstein referred directly to the growing evidence of the failures of traditional police practices:

Recently completed research questions the value of two major aspects of police operations – preventive patrol and investigations conducted by detectives. Some police administrators have challenged the findings; others are awaiting the results of replication. But those who concur with the results have begun to search for alternatives, aware of the need to measure the effectiveness of a new response before making a substantial investment in it. (1979: 240)

William Bratton (1998a) in describing the emergence of Compstat in New York City, also refers to the failures of traditional approaches, and the need for innovation that would allow the police to be more effective in doing something about crime problems:

The effects of rapidly responding to crimes were muted because research showed it took people almost 10 minutes to decide to call the police in the first place. And police riding in air-conditioned squad cars, rapidly going from call to call, did not make people feel safer. In fact, it further separated the police from the public, the consumers of police services.

Fortunately, the researchers and practitioners did not stop their work at finding what was not working, but began to look at how to think differently about crime and disorder and develop strategies that would work. (1998: 31)

More generally, the turn of the last century was a period of tremendous change in police practices. This is perhaps most evident in the development of community-oriented policing, which was aided by financial support from the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services established in 1994. As Wesley Skogan reports in this volume, community policing in some form has been adopted by most police agencies in the United States. In a Police Foundation survey conducted in 1997, 85 percent of surveyed police agencies reported they had adopted community policing or were in the process of doing so (Skogan forthcoming). A Bureau of Justice Statistics survey (2003) conducted at the turn of the century found that more than 90 percent of departments in cities over 250,000 in population reported having full-time, trained community policing officers in the field (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2003).

The openness of police agencies to innovation is perhaps even more strongly illustrated by the sudden rise of Compstat as a police practice. Compstat was only developed as a programmatic entity in 1994 and was not encouraged financially by federally funded programs. Nonetheless by the turn of the century more than a third of larger police agencies had claimed to have implemented the program and a quarter of police agencies claimed that they were planning to adopt a Compstat program (Weisburd *et al.* 2003).

A number of police scholars have suggested that the changes that such surveys observe are more cosmetic than substantive. Some studies have documented the “shallow” implementation of police innovations, and have suggested that in the end the police tend to fall back on traditional methods of conducting police work (e.g., see Clarke 1998; Eck 2000). For example, even in police agencies that have adopted innovations in problem-oriented policing, careful analysis of the activities of the police suggest that they are more likely to follow traditional police practices than to choose innovative approaches (Braga and Weisburd in this volume). Moreover, the main practices of the standard model of policing continue to dominate the work of most police agencies (Committee to Review Research 2004).

While the depth of innovation over the last few decades remains a matter of debate, it is certainly the case that police agencies have become open to the idea of innovation, and that new programs and practices have been experimented with and adopted at a rapid pace over the last

few decades. We think this openness can be traced to the crisis in police legitimacy and effectiveness that we have described.

### **Understanding the form and character of police innovation**

Recognizing the importance of the challenges to policing that began to emerge in the late 1960s can help us to understand not only the cause for a period of rapid innovation, but also the form and character of the innovations that we observe in this period and which are the focus of our volume. The innovations we study here represent different forms of adaptation to similar problems. Overall, they seek to find a solution to a set of challenges to the effectiveness and legitimacy of policing we have reviewed.

Community policing, which is examined in the next section of our volume, is one of the first new approaches to policing to emerge in this modern period of police innovation. Community policing programs were already being implemented and advocated in the 1980s (e.g., Trojanowicz 1982; Goldstein 1987; Cordner 1988; Green and Mastrofski 1988; Weisbord and McElroy 1988; Trojanowicz 1989), and by the 1990s, as we have already noted, the idea of community policing had affected most American police agencies. Police practices associated with community policing have been diverse and have often changed over time. Foot patrol, for example, was considered an important element of community policing in the 1980s, but has not been a core component of more recent community policing programs. Community policing has often been implemented in combination with other programs, such as problem-oriented policing, thus making it difficult to distinguish the core components of community policing from those of other innovations that developed during this period.

Nonetheless, community policing represented a radical departure from the professional model of policing that was dominant in the post-World War II period. For decades the police had assumed that the main task of policing was to fight crime, and that the police, like other professionals, could successfully carry out their task with little help and preferably with little interference from the public. The police were the experts in defining the nature of crime problems and the nature of the solutions that could be brought to do something about them. The community in this context did not have a central role in the police function, and the responsibility for crime problems lay squarely in the hands of the policing industry.

One core element of the community policing movement was that the community should play a central role in defining the problems the police

address, and that these problems should extend much beyond conventional law enforcement. As Kelling and Moore (1988: 4) argue, “during the 1950s and 1960s, police thought they were law enforcement agencies primarily fighting crime.” In the “community era” or community policing era, the police function broadens and includes “order maintenance, conflict resolution, provision of services through problem solving, as well as other activities” (Kelling and Moore 1988: 2). The justification for these new activities was drawn either from a claim that historically the police had indeed carried out such functions, or that the community from which the police gained legitimacy saw these as important functions of the police.

David Bayley notes that this approach “creates a new role for police with new criteria for performance”:

If police can not reduce crime and apprehend more offenders, they can at least decrease fear of crime, make the public feel less powerless, lessen distrust between minority groups and the police, mediate quarrels, overcome the isolation of marginal groups, organize social services, and generally assist in developing “community.” These are certainly worthwhile objectives. But are they what the police should be doing? They are a far cry from what the police were originally created to do. (Bayley 1988: 228)

One way to understand the early development of community policing is to recognize that it responds to the question: What is the justification for the police if they cannot prevent crime? While crime fighting has increasingly become a central concern in community policing over the last decade, an important contribution of community policing to police innovation was its recognition that there were many critical community problems that the police could address that were not traditionally defined as crime problems. The expansion of the police function was to become an important part of many of the innovations that are discussed in this volume. This definition of new tasks for policing can be seen in part as a response to the failure of police to achieve the crime control goals of the professional model of policing.

Other innovations in policing in this period also looked to redefine the role of the police in one way or another. Broken windows policing, the subject of Part II of our volume, also seeks to direct the police to problems that had often been ignored in standard police practices. The idea of broken windows policing developed out of a Police Foundation study, the Newark Foot Patrol Experiment, published in 1981. From that study James Q. Wilson and George Kelling (1982) identified a link between social disorder and crime which suggested the importance of police paying attention to many problems that were seen in earlier decades

as peripheral to the police function. Wilson and Kelling were impressed by the activities of the police officers who walked patrol in the Police Foundation study, and thought that what might be seen in traditional policing as inappropriate behavior actually held the key to public safety and crime reduction. Kelling and Coles (1996: 18) write:

Most New Jersey police chiefs were dismayed when they learned from program evaluators what (anonymous) officers, who were supposed to be “fighting crime,” were actually doing while on foot patrol. For example, after being called a second time during the same evening to end brawls in the same bar, one foot patrol officer had had enough: although the “bar time” was some hours away, he ordered the bar closed for business as usual. The bartender grumbled, closed up, and opened the next day for business as usual. When this incident was recounted to the chief of the department in which it occurred . . . he responded, “that wouldn’t happen in my department, the officer would be fired.”

Wilson and Kelling argued that concern with disorder was an essential ingredient for doing something about crime problems. Indeed, the broken windows thesis was that serious crime developed because the police and citizens did not work together to prevent urban decay and social disorder:

(A)t the community level, disorder and crime are usually inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence. Social psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window in a building is broken *and is left unrepaired*, all of the rest of the windows will soon be broken. (Wilson and Kelling 1982: 31)

In the context of crime, Wilson and Kelling argued “that ‘unintended’ behavior also leads to the breakdown of community controls”:

A stable neighborhood of families who care for their homes, mind each other’s children, and confidently frown on unwanted intruders can change in a few years or even a few months, to an inhospitable and frightening jungle. A piece of property is abandoned, weeds grow up, a window is smashed. Adults stop scolding rowdy children; the children emboldened, become more rowdy. Families move out, unattached adults move in . . . Such an area is vulnerable to criminal invasion. Though it is not inevitable, it is more likely here, rather than in places where people are confident they can regulate public behavior by informal controls . . . (Wilson and Kelling 1982: 31)

Broken windows policing encourages the police to be concerned with problems of disorder, and moves crime itself to a secondary, or at least second-stage goal of the police. From the perspective of the crisis of policing we have described, broken windows policing again responds to the crisis of police effectiveness by expanding the police function. Both in community policing and broken windows policing the failures of crime fighting became less important, because the police function was seen to lie in good part in other activities.

Problem-oriented policing, the subject of Part III of our volume, also sought to broaden the problems that police approached. In Herman Goldstein's original formulation of problem-oriented policing in 1979 he argued that the "police job requires that they deal with a wide range of behavioral problems that arise in the community" (1979: 242). However, in this case, the solution for the crisis of policing was not found in the definition of new tasks for the police, but rather in a critique of traditional police practice. Goldstein assumed that the police could impact crime and other problems if they took a different approach, in this case, the problem-oriented policing approach. Accordingly, a second response to the crisis we have described is not to accept, as some academic criminologists had, that the police could not do something about crime and thus to search to define other important police functions as central (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990; Bayley 1994) but to argue that the strategies of the standard policing model were flawed and that new more effective models could be developed.

Problem-oriented policing sought to redefine the way in which the police did their job. Goldstein argued that the police had "lost sight" of their primary task which was to do something about crime and other problems, and instead had become focused on the "means" of allocating police resources. He identified this pathology as a common one in large organizations, and sought through the model of problem solving to develop a more successful method of ameliorating crime and other community problems.

Other innovations in policing that emerged fully only in the 1990s also take the approach that the police can be effective in doing something about crime if they adopt innovative police practices. Pulling levers policing discussed in Part IV, adopts a problem-oriented approach, but provides a broader and more comprehensive combination of strategies than more traditional problem-oriented policing programs. Pioneered in Boston to deal with an "epidemic" of youth violence (Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga 1996), the pulling levers approach begins by drawing upon a collection of law enforcement practitioners to analyze crime problems and develop innovative solutions. It seeks to develop a variety of "levers" to stop offenders from continuing criminal behavior that include not only criminal justice interventions, but also social services and community resources.

Third-party policing discussed in Part V, offers another solution to the failures of the standard policing model. It follows suggestions made by Herman Goldstein (1979) that the "tool box" of police strategies be expanded. In this case, however, the resources of the police are expanded to "third parties" that are believed to offer significant new resources

for doing something about crime and disorder.<sup>2</sup> The opportunity for a third-party policing approach developed in part from more general trends in the relationship between civil and criminal law (Mann 1992; Mazerolle and Ransley in this volume). The expansion of the civil law and its use in other legal contexts as a method of dealing with problems that were once considered to be the exclusive province of criminal statutes created important new tools for the police. Third-party policing asserts that the police cannot successfully deal with many problems on their own, and thus that the failures of traditional policing models may be found in the limits of police powers. Using civil ordinances and civil courts, or the resources of private agencies, third-party policing recognizes that much social control is exercised by institutions other than the police and that crime can be managed through agencies other than the criminal law.

Hot spots policing discussed in Part VI, was first examined in the Minneapolis Hot Spots Experiment (Sherman and Weisburd 1995). The Minneapolis study was developed as a direct response to the findings of the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment. Drawing upon empirical evidence that crime was clustered in discrete hot spots (e.g., see Pierce, Spaar, and Briggs 1986; Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger 1989; Weisburd, Maher, and Sherman 1992), Sherman and Weisburd argued that preventive patrol might be effective if it was more tightly focused. If “only 3 percent of the addresses in a city produce more than half of all the requests for police response, if no police are dispatched to 40 percent of the addresses and intersections in a city over one year, and, if among the 60 percent with any requests the majority register only one request a year, then concentrating police in a few locations makes more sense than spreading them evenly through a beat” (Sherman and Weisburd 1995: 629). Hot spots policing does not demand that the police change their strategies, but requires that they focus them more carefully at places where crime is clustered.

Compstat, discussed in Part VII, also responds to the failures of the standard model of policing by critiquing the ways in which the police carry out their task. However, in the case of Compstat the focus is less on the specific strategies that the police are involved in and more on the nature of police organization itself. Herman Goldstein noted in 1979 that the failures of the standard model of policing could be explained by the fact that police organizations were poorly organized to do something about crime. Compstat was designed to overcome that limitation. It sought to empower the police command structure to do something about crime problems. William Bratton, the New York City police chief who coined the term and developed the program wrote:

We created a system in which the police commissioner, with his executive core, first empowers and then interrogates the precinct commander, forcing him or her to come up with a plan to attack crime. But it should not stop there. At the next level down, it should be the precinct commander, taking the same role as the commissioner, empowering and interrogating the platoon commander. Then, at the third level, the platoon commander should be asking his sergeants . . . all the way down until everyone in the entire organization is empowered and motivated, active and assessed and successful. It works in all organizations, whether it's 38,000 New York cops or Mayberry, R. F. D. (Bratton 1998b: 239)

Evidence-based policing, discussed in Part VIII also traces the failures of traditional policing practices to the ways in which the police carry out their tasks. It draws from a much wider set of public policy concerns, and a broader policy movement than other police innovations examined in this volume. There is a growing consensus among scholars, practitioners, and policymakers that crime control practices and policies should be rooted as much as possible in scientific research (Sherman 1988; Cullen and Gendreau 2000; MacKenzie 2000; Sherman *et al.* 2002). Over the last decade there has been a steady growth in interest in the evaluation of criminal justice programs and practices reflected in part by the growth in criminal justice funding for research during this period (Visher and Weisburd 1998; <http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/crimred.htm>). Increasing support for research and evaluation in criminal justice may be seen as part of a more general trend toward utilization of scientific research for establishing rational and effective practices and policies. This trend is perhaps most prominent in the health professions where the idea of "evidence-based medicine" has gained strong government and professional support (Millenson 1997; Zuger 1997), though the evidence-based paradigm is also developing in other fields (e.g., see Nutley and Davies 1999; Davies, Nutley, and Smith 2000). The evidence-based approach does not necessarily assume that the police can be more effective, but it argues that a reliance on evidence in the police industry is a prerequisite for the development of effective policing practices (Sherman 1988).

## Conclusion

In our Introduction we have traced the wide diffusion of innovations in the last decades of the twentieth century to a crisis of police practices that had begun to develop in the late 1960s. We have argued that it is not accidental that so much innovation was brought to American policing during this period. Indeed, such innovation can be understood in the

context of a series of challenges to American policing that created a perceived need for change among the police, scholars, and the public. We have also argued that the paths of police innovation can be understood in the context of the critiques that developed of standard policing models. In some cases, the innovations minimized the importance of crime fighting, which had been the main focus of earlier policing models. Such innovations responded to the crisis of policing by defining a broader or new set of tasks which the police could perform more effectively. Other innovations, however, started with a critique of the methods used in the traditional policing models. These innovations assumed that the police could be more effective, even in preventing or controlling crime, if the tactics used were changed.

In the following chapters prominent police scholars examine each of the innovations that we have discussed. The format of advocates and critiques provides a broad framework for assessing these innovations and allows us to identify the major advantages and disadvantages of these approaches. In our conclusions we try to draw more general lessons from these contributions, and discuss the possible directions that police innovation will take in the coming decades.

#### NOTES

We would like to thank our colleagues John Eck, David Klinger, Cynthia Lum, Lorraine Mazerolle, and Stephen Mastrofski for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this introductory chapter. Helpful comments were also provided by Kristen Miggans, a graduate student at the University of Maryland, who also assisted us in preparing the manuscript for publication.

1. It is important to note that a number of large social experiments were conducted during this period (e.g., see Bell *et al.* 1980; Struyk and Bendick 1981) and thus the Kansas City Preventive Patrol experiment can be seen as part of a larger effort to subject social programs to systematic empirical study.
2. It is important to note that the impetus for third-party policing does not necessarily come from the police. Mazerolle and Ransley (2006) argues that a variety of external demands have imposed third-party policing on the police industry.

#### REFERENCES

Altschuler, A. A. and Behn, R. D. (eds.) (1997). *Innovation in American government: Challenges, opportunities, and dilemmas*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

Bayley, D. H. (1988). Community policing: A report from the devil's advocate. In J. R. Greene and S. D. Mastrofski (eds.), *Community policing: Rhetoric or reality?* (pp. 225–238). New York: Praeger.

(1994). *Police for the future*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Bell, J. G., Robins, P. K., Spiegelman, R. G., and Weiner, S. (eds.) (1980). *A guaranteed annual income: Evidence from a social experiment*. New York: Academic Press.

Bratton, W. J. (1998a). Crime is down in New York City: Blame the police. In W. J. Bratton and N. Dennis (eds.), *Zero tolerance: Policing a free society*. London: Institute of Economic Affairs Health and Welfare Unit.

Bratton, W. J. with Knobler, P. (1998b). *Turnaround: How America's top cop reversed the crime epidemic*. New York: Random House.

Bundy, McGeorge. (1970, July). Press Conference. Presented in New York City, NY.

Bureau of Justice Statistics. (2003). *Local police departments 2000*. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, US Department of Justice.

Chaiken, J. (1978). What is known about deterrent effects of police activities. In J. Cromer (ed.), *Preventing crime* (pp. 109–136). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Clarke, R. (1998). Defining police strategies: Problem solving, problem-oriented policing and community-oriented policing. In T. O'Connor Shelley and A. C. Grant (eds.), *Problem-oriented policing: Crime-specific problems, critical issues, and making POP work*. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

Committee to Review Research on Police Policy and Practices. (2004). *Fairness and effectiveness in policing: The evidence*. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.

Cordner, G. (1988). A problem-oriented approach to community-oriented policing. In J. Greene and S. Mastrofski (eds.), *Community policing: Rhetoric or reality?* New York: Praeger.

Cullen, F. and Gendreau, P. (2000). Assessing correctional rehabilitation: Policy, practice, and prospects. In J. Horney (ed.), *Policies, processes, and decisions of the criminal justice system: Criminal justice 3*. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice.

Davies, H. T. O., Nutley, S., and Smith, P. (2000). *What works: Evidence-based policy and practice in public services*. London: Policy Press.

Eck, J. E. (1983). *Solving crime: A study of the investigation of burglary and robbery*. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

(2000). Problem-oriented policing and it's problems: The means over ends syndrome strikes back and the return of the problem-solver. Unpublished manuscript. Cincinnati, OH: University of Cincinnati.

Goldstein, H. (1979). Improving policing: A problem oriented approach. *Crime and Delinquency*, 24, 236–258.

(1987). Toward community-oriented policing: Potential, basic requirements, and threshold questions. *Crime and Delinquency*, 25, 236–258.

Gottfredson, M. and Hirschi, T. (1990). *A general theory of crime*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Greene, J. and Mastrofski, S. (eds.) (1988). *Community policing: Rhetoric or reality?* New York: Praeger.

Greenwood, P. W., Chaiken, J., Petersilia, M., and Prusoff, L. (1975). *Criminal investigation process, III: Observations and analysis*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.

Greenwood, P. W., Petersilia, J., and Chaiken, J. (1977). *The criminal investigation process*. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.

Kansas City Police Department. (1977). *Response time analysis*. Kansas City, MO: Kansas City Police Department.

Kelling, G. L. and Coles, C. M. (1996). *Fixing broken windows: Restoring order and reducing crime in our communities*. New York: The Free Press.

Kelling, G. L. and Moore, M. H. (1988). From political to reform to community: The evolving strategy of police. In J. R. Greene and S. D. Mastrofski (eds.), *Community policing: Rhetoric or reality?* New York: Praeger Publishers.

Kelling, G. L., Pate, A., Dieckman, D., and Brown, C. E. (1974). *The Kansas City preventative patrol experiment: Technical report*. Washington, DC: Police Foundation.

Kelling, G. L., Pate, A., Ferrera, A., Utne, M., and Brown, C. E. (1981). *Newark foot patrol experiment*. Washington, DC: The Police Foundation.

Kennedy, D., Piehl, A., and Braga, A. (1996). Youth violence in Boston: Gun markets, serious offenders, and a use-reduction strategy. *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 59, 147–196.

Kerner Commission. (1968). *National advisory commission on civil disorder*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.

Klinger, D. A. (2003). Spreading diffusion in criminology. *Criminology and Public Policy*, 2(3), 461–468.

LaFree, G. (1998). *Losing legitimacy: Street crime and the decline of social institutions in America*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Larson, R. C. and Cahn, M. F. (1985). *Synthesizing and extending the results of police patrols*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.

Levine, J. P. (1975). Ineffectiveness of adding police to prevent crime. *Public Policy*, 23, 523–545.

MacKenzie, D. (2000). Evidence-based corrections: Identifying what works. *Crime and Delinquency*, 46, 457–471.

Mann, K. (1992). Punitive civil sanctions: The middleground between criminal and civil law. *Yale Law Journal*, 101(8), 1795–1873.

Mazerolle, L. G. and Ransley, J. (2006). *Third-party policing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Millenson, M. L. (1997). *Demanding medical excellence: Doctors and accountability in the information age*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Minneapolis Medical Research Foundation, Inc. (1976). Critiques and commentaries on evaluation research activities – Russell Sage reports. *Evaluation*, 3(1–2), 115–138.

Murphy, P. V. (1974). Foreword. In G. L. Kelling, T. Pate, D. Dieckman, and C. E. Brown, *The Kansas City preventative patrol experiment: Technical report*. Washington, DC: Police Foundation.

Nutley, S. and Davies, H. T. O. (1999). The fall and rise of evidence in criminal justice. *Public Money and Management*, 19, 47–54.

Ostrom, E., Whitaker, G., and Parks, R. (1978). Policing: Is there a system? In J. May and A. Wildavsky (eds.), *The policy cycle*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Pierce, G., Spaar, S., and Briggs, L. R. (1986). *The character of police work: Strategic and tactical implications*. Boston, MA: Center for Applied Social Research, Northeastern University.

President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. (1967). *The crime commission report: The challenge of crime in a free society*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.

Press, S. J. (1971). *Some effects of an increase in police manpower in the 20th precinct of New York City*. New York: New York City Rand Institute.

Reiss, A. J., Jr. and Roth, J. A. (eds.) (1993). *Understanding and preventing violence: Panel on the understanding and control of violent behavior*. Washington DC: National Academy Press.

Rogers, E. M. (1995). *Diffusion of innovations* (4th ed.). New York: Free Press.

Schnelle, J. F., Kirchner, R. E., Jr., Casey, J. D., Uselton, P. H., Jr., and McNees, M. P. (1977). Patrol evaluation research: A multiple-baseline analysis of saturation police patrolling during day and night hours. *Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis*, 10, 33–40.

Sherman, L. W. (1998). *Evidence-based policing. Ideas in American policing series*. Washington, DC: The Police Foundation.

Sherman, L. W. and Weisburd, D. (1995). General deterrent effects of police patrol in crime "hot-spots": A randomized controlled trial. *Justice Quarterly*, 12, 626–648.

Sherman, L. W., Gartin, P. R., and Buerger, M. E. (1989). Hot spots of predatory crime: Routine activities and the criminology of place. *Criminology*, 27, 27–56.

Sherman, L. W., Farrington, D., Welsh, B., and MacKenzie, D. (eds.) (2002). *Evidence based crime prevention*. New York: Routledge.

Skogan, W. G. (in Press). Impediments to community policing. In L. Fridell and M. A. Wycoff (eds.), *The future of community policing*. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

Skogan, W. G. and Antunes, G. E. (1979). Information, apprehension, and deterrence: Exploring the limits of police productivity. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 7, 217–241.

Spelman, W. and Brown, D. K. (1984). *Calling the police: Citizen reporting of serious crime*. Washington: US Government Printing Office.

Struyk, R. J. and Bendick, M., Jr. (eds.) (1981). *Housing vouchers for the poor: Lessons from a national experiment*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press.

Trojanowicz, R. (1982). *An evaluation of the neighborhood foot patrol program in Flint, Michigan*. East Lansing, MI: National Neighborhood Foot Patrol Center, Michigan State University.

(1989). *Preventing civil disturbances: A community policing approach*. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University, National Center for Community Policing.

Visher, C. and Weisburd, D. (1998). Identifying what works: Recent trends in crime prevention strategies. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 28, 223–242.

Weisburd, D. and Eck, J. E. (2004). What can police do to reduce crime, disorder, and fear? *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 593, 42–65.

Weisburd, D. and Lum, C. (2005). The diffusion of computerized crime mapping policing: Linking research and practice. *Police Practice and Research*, 6(5), 433–448.

Weisburd, D. and McElroy, J. E. (1988). Enacting the CPO (Community Patrol Officer) role: Findings from the New York City pilot program in community policing. In J. R. Greene and S. D. Mastrofski (eds.), *Community policing: Rhetoric or reality?* New York: Praeger Publishers.

Weisburd, D., Maher, L., and Sherman, L. W. (1992). Contrasting crime general and crime specific theory: The case of hot-spots of crime. *Advances in Criminological Theory*, 4, 45–70.

Weisburd, D., Mastrofski, S. D., McNally, A. M., Greenspan, R., and Willis, J. J. (2003). Reforming to preserve: Compstat and strategic problem solving in American policing. *Criminology and Public Policy*, 2(3), 421–456.

Weiss, A. (1997). The communication of innovation in American policing. *Policing*, 20, 292–310.

Wilson, J. Q. and Kelling, G. L. (1982). Broken windows: The police and neighborhood safety. *The Atlantic Monthly*, March, 29–38.

Zuger, A. (1997). New way of doctoring: By the book. *The New York Times*. December 16.

